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1. Introduction 
The study of government growth is one of the fastest growing research areas 
in public choice. Public sector growth appears to be universal at all levels of 
government as shown by a rich data set that permits the t sting of a large num- 
ber of hypotheses. Many competing and complementary h potheses have been 
offered to explain public sector growth. 1 Following the 1970s "taxpayer 
revolts," many studies have examined the abilities of various constraints to 
control the public sector size and, more specifically, government spending. 2 
As the hypotheses and tests become more sophisticated, the importance of 
another esearch area has become increasingly evident: an appropriate measure 
of public participation in the economy is quite elusive. While important, 
government employment data and simple government expenditure-to-GNP ra-
tios are incomplete measures of government size. Not only are governments 
financed by many sources (legislated taxes, inflation-related taxes, grants, 
debt-issue and off-budget receipts), but also many areas of government activity 
elude simple measurement (regulations, resource allocation via subsidy, and 
legislation). Clearly, the issue of measurement is important for understanding 
the public sector as well as the ability to empirically test relevant hypotheses. 
This paper examines an often-overlooked, or well-hidden, facet of the public 
sector. It examines the "off -budget" sectors' relation to ther less-hidden 
facets of the public sector. Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) is the seminal work 
in this area. Arguing that local governments evade tax- and expenditure- 
limitations by placing vast amounts of expenditures off-budget, Bennett and 
DiLorenzo provide two important pieces of information in the study of the 
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public sector. One, their evidence demonstrates that off-budget activity is an 
important dimension i  public sector size. Two, it suggests that total govern- 
ment spending is influenced by relative prices and constraints on politicians. 
That total government spending isinfluenced by relative prices and political 
constraints is the primary thesis of this paper. By treating the off-budget activi- 
ties of state and local governments a one form of public participation i the 
economy, we model the interrelations between governments' off-budget and 
on-budget activities to explain the choice of total budgetary allocations by state 
and local governments. After focusing on the relative substitutability of on- 
and off-budget activities and controlling for the effects of various upply-side 
factors (federal grants, tax- and expenditure-limitations, debt-issue), the 
results uggest that the size of governments' off-budget activity is strongly in- 
fluenced by its on-budget spending. That is, "big" on-budget spenders tend to 
be "big" off-budget spenders as well. 
2. Existing literature on government size 
The traditional literature on government size generally measures public sector 
activity as on-budget spending relative to income, or population. 3 However, it 
is commonly known that government participation i an economy extends far 
beyond its expenditures. These "non-expenditure" items include tariffs, off- 
budget items, subsidies, entry barriers, minimum wage laws, rent-controls, 
mortgage interest deductions, tax credits, equal opportunity laws, legal drink- 
ing ages, and so forth. While all these non-expenditure items reflect a large and 
diverse array of sometimes-conflicting, sometimes-consistent goals of govern- 
ment policy, they all affect resource allocations. Consequently, traditional 
measures of government size represent underestimates of the true impact of the 
public sector on resource allocation and this measurement problem inevitably 
pervades all empirical studies by introducing measurement error. 4 
The available evidence on heretofore "hidden" government offers valuable 
information on the extent of total public participation i  the economy. Bennett 
and DiLorenzo (1982) provide a painstaking study of one effective means of 
circumventing taxpayer-control over government spending: off-budget enter- 
prises. The fact that debts, expenditures, and additional revenues are not neces- 
sarily approved by voters creates an incentive for politicians to go off-budget. 
The argument is made that recent "tax-revolts" and enactments of tax- and 
spend-limitations are not perfectly effective in exerting fiscal discipline on 
governments. Byplacing billions of dollars off-budget, Bennett and DiLorenzo 
document extensive circumvention of existing tax- and expenditure-limita- 
tions. Evidence in support of the notion that state and local governments cir- 
cumvent intent of tax- and expenditure-limitations can be found in Bails (1982) 
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and Abrams and Dougan (1986). At the federal level, Marlow and Manage 
(1987) argue that the existence of national debt ceilings have not stopped Con- 
gress from approving higher ceilings whenever they become binding. More- 
over, the use of off-budget spending at the federal level has grown rapidly over 
the past ten years. 
An interesting attempt at providing a more comprehensive measure of 
government is the focus of Shughart and Tollison (1986) which measures 
government size as the legislative output of the U.S. Congress. Examples of 
legislative output are numbers of bills introduced, length of session and bills 
passed per legislator. While there are obvious problems of data interpretation, 
the advantage of this approach isthat the data represent the legislation behind 
all facets of government participation and represents one alternative for meas- 
uring government size. 5 
3. Model of off-budget behavior 
One recurrent proposition i  past research isthat the growth of some specified 
governmental ctivity is primarily due to one causal factor. Buchanan d 
Wagner (1978) focus on fiscal illusion as the primary cause of public budget 
deficits. 6Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) focus on political circumvention of
tax- and expenditure-limitations via off-budget enterprises a the causal expla- 
nation of growth in off-budget activities. Friedman (1978) has argued that the 
political gains from taxing through inflation preclude the federal government 
from eliminating inflation. Manage and Marlow (1986) argue that past tax in- 
creases may explain government growth. 
While all the above hypotheses may contain essential elements of empirical 
support, acommon factor is some notion of the relative costs of funding total 
government activity. In this sense, we are mainly concerned with supply-related 
government activity. 
We have already outlined the various forms of public activity: on- and off- 
budget spending, regulations, laws and so forth. The corresponding forms of 
finance include legislated taxes, inflation-related taxes, federal grants to state 
and local governments, debt-issue, and off-budget subsidization, taxation, and 
fees. Two factors determine the vital characteristics of the funding constraint. 
One, the relative costs of these various funding sources. To finance a given 
level of public activity, economic theory suggests that governments will utilize 
relatively cheaper funding sources. That is, optimal usage of funding para- 
meters depends on the relative costs of all sources: legislated taxes, debt-issue, 
off-budget revenues, grants, etc. 
Two, the relative costs of the funding sources are affected by supply-side fac- 
tors. Three examples follow which suggest that changes in the relative costs of 
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funding affect the way in which government is financed and the way in which 
it grows. Bennett and DiLorenzo argue that the tax revolt resulted in an in- 
crease in tax- and expenditure-limitations which, by raising the costs of "going 
on-budget," resulted in increased use of off-budget activities. Buchanan and 
Wagner argue that when politicians or the citizenry lowered the resistance to 
deficit-finance, more spending was financed by debt-issuance (and less through 
taxation) which ultimately resulted in more government via higher fiscal illu- 
sion. Manage and Marlow argue that the recent outcry against deficits may be 
the result of an increase in the relative cost of financing spending growth 
through debt-issue. These three examples uggest that institutional supply-side 
considerations such as tax- and expenditure-limitations a d balanced budget 
rules may affect the relative costs of funding and consequently he size and 
composition of public sectors. 
Formally, we hypothesize that the size of off-budget activity is related to the 
demand for total government activity and the relative costs of the different 
forms of funding. Specifically, we model the size of off-budget activity by state 
and local governments a : 
OFF f(ON, GRANTS, TEL, DEBT, GON) 
where OFF size of off-budget activities 
ON size of on-budget activities 
GRANTS size of grants 
TEL tax- and expenditure-limit dummy 
DEBT size of debt-issue 
GON change in on-budget activities over time. 
ON is defined as total government expenditures relative to the gross state 
product and, in a second specification, relative to per capita expenditures. The 
regressions were also estimated using expenditures net of public utility and li- 
quor store expenditures, but since the results are not affected they are not 
reported here. 
Since we assume that politicians do not have non-cost-related preferences 
for how they finance government activities, ON is one way to measure the de- 
mand for government. That is, it measures the government-bias in a state. 
States with large ONs are assumed to prefer a relatively large total government 
sector. Because of our assumption that politicians do not have a non-cost- 
related preference for on- vs. off-budget activity, the same demand-related de- 
terminants of government (median income, population and its density, educa- 
tion . . . )  should be contained in this variable that would influence OFF and 
therefore we avoid potential multicollinearity problems between ON and rele- 
vant demand-related variables. 
To the extent hat federal grants reduce the price of total state and local 
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government activities larger GRANTS, defined as the ratio of federal grants 
to state and local revenues, hould be associated with reduced need to "hide" 
on-budget activities and results in lower off-budget activities. Evidence that 
grants to sub-federal governments reduce that tax-price perception is found in 
Winer (1983) and Logan (1986). 
In states where legislatures have a strong preference for large government, 
the presence of limits on government expenditures TEL is expected to lead to 
an expansion of off-budget activity. Following the Bennett and DiLorenzo ar- 
gument hat growth in off-budget activity is related to tax- and expenditure- 
laws, we use adummy variable for the nineteen states that had nominal tax and 
expenditure limitations in effect in 1984. Following the Misiolek and Elder 
(1988) criteria, we define TEL 1 for states with tax- and expenditure-laws 
and TEL 0 otherwise. 7 While Misiolek and Elder report that tax- and 
expenditure-limitations have exerted significant influences on public budgets, 
Abrams and Dougan (1986) find no such effect. For those who believe that tax- 
and expenditure-laws are not effective in controling public budgets, TEL 
should not exert a statistically significant effect on OFF. A positive sign should 
be hypothesized for those who believe the Bennett and DiLorenzo argument 
that tax- and expenditure-limitations lead to greater off-budget activity. 
Debt-financing, by creating the fiscal illusion of low tax burden, is expected 
to reduce the need to "hide" on-budget activities. Therefore, DEBT, defined 
as the ratio of outstanding debt to total revenue, isexpected to exert a negative 
effect on the size of off-budget activities,  
Finally, we also consider the effects of growth of on-budget activities on the 
size of off-budget activities. We hypothesize that states experiencing the stron- 
gest growth in on-budget expenditures GON have a greater need to expand the 
size of OFF. Assuming no change in the relative cost burden of off-budget 
financing total government vis-a-vis other means of financing, faster growth 
in total financing needs hould be associated with greater usage of off-budget 
financing. 9 Given available data, we define GON as the growth of on-budget 
state and local government expenditures over a six-year period (1979-1984). 
Table 1 displays ummary statistics for selected variables. 
4. Results 
Two specifications of (1) are estimated. Government expenditures (ON, GON) 
are normalized by population (per capita) and by the gross state product 
(GSP). Our measure of OFF, also normalized by population and GSP, is the 
gross state product of state and local government enterprises (GSPGE). 
GSPGE is the expenditure variable and is the sum of the earnings, subsidies, 
plus the surpluses or deficits of such establishments. 1° This measure is identi- 
cal to the value of the output of these establishments which represents oper- 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of selected variables 
Normalized by population 
Off On Grants Debt 
Mean 1180.57 2261.56 0.15 0.83 
Std. dev 194.56 455.94 0.03 0.24 
Min 878.99 1560.08 0.10 0.43 
Max 1867.45 4113.84 0.22 1.55 
Normalized by GSP 
Off On Grants Debt 
Mean 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.83 
Std. dev. 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.24 
Min 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.43 
Max 0.10 0.19 0.22 1.55 
ating and capital expenses, including interest expenses on outstanding debt. 
The enterprises encompass power, electric, gas, water and sewage, transporta- 
tion, highways, and lotteries. 
We estimate using OLS the two specifications of (1) on 1984 data for all 
states excluding Alaska. Scheduled Department of Commerce revisions of na- 
tional income and product accounts preempts us from using more recent data. 
Preliminary work suggests that, while the results do not change with its inclu- 
sion, Alaska is an outlier. Data on gross state product, including that of state 
and local government enterprises, are obtained from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1988); state and local expenditures, revenues, grants, and out- 
standing debt in 1984 from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1985b); state 
and local government expenditures in 1979 from the U.S. Department of Com- 
merce (1980); and population from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1987). 
Table 2 displays the regression results for the model normalized by popula- 
tion. Due to potential multicollinearity problems between the various supply- 
related factors, we have included ON and GRANTS in all equations, but isolat- 
ed out the separate ffects of TEL, DEBT and GON by not including them 
together in the same equation. In other estimations, we have run various other 
specifications with including all or some subset ogether in the same equations. 
To conserve space, we have not included them her since in most cases the results 
do not change. The only case in which there appears to be significant multicol- 
linearity is between ON and GON. Because of simple correlations between 
these two variables of approximately -0.82 ( -0.65 when normalized by GSP), 
we have chosen to display the effects of GON in two ways: by itself and with 
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e ave osen  isplay he f ects f   o ys: y self nd ith 
Table 2. Off-budget regressions a (normalized by population) 
Constant 1.77 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.81 1.07 
12.02 8.06 8.00 13.46 7.71 8.45 10.82 
GRANTS 3.77 2.34 -2.39 -2.34 2.45 
4.04 5.84 5.80 5.76 6.23 
ON 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 
14.92 14.81 7.63 15.42 
TEL 0.01 
0.60 
GON 0.48 0.01 
8.32 .10 
DEBT 0.08 0.13 
1.92 1.14 
R2 .24 .87 .87 0.59 0.86 0.87 .01 
F 16.36 158.02 103.99 69.19 103.09 112.76 1.30 
n 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
s.e.e. .17 .07 .07 .15 .07 .07 .20 
a t-statistics below estimated coefficients. 
ON. This strong col l inearity suggests that the size o f  the public sector has 
grown more rapid ly in those states that exhibit relatively low levels of  ON. A 
similar problem, albeit much weaker,  exists between ON and DEBT and there- 
fore we have displayed the effect of  DEBT in two ways as well. 
The results are general ly consistent with our expectations. The est imated 
coeff icient on ON is always posit ive and highly statist ical ly signif icant. The 
coefficients on GRANTS are always statistical ly signif icant and of  the 
hypothesized negative sign. As hypothesized, the coeff icient on DEBT is nega- 
tive and statistical ly signif icant. When run by itself, the growth of  total  expen- 
ditures GON is found to be posit ively related to OFF .  However,  in the presence 
of  ON,  it is found to not exert a signif icant effect on OFF .  Because of  the high 
negative col l inearity between ON and GON,  it would appear that they are 
measur ing the same basic piece of  in format ion:  governments with relatively 
large expenditures as well as governments with rapid growth in expenditures 
tend to have larger values of  OFF .  As such, this is evidence in support  of  the 
Bennett and DiLorenzo hypothesis that OFF  is posit ively related to past on- 
budget growth. 
The lack of  statistical signif icance on TEL suggests that tax- and expen- 
diture- l imitat ions do not affect of f -budget activity. Whi le some may argue that 
this f inding suggests that the Bennett and DiLorenzo hypothesis is not valid, 
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 ck tatistical significan e   ggest  at x- d xpen­
iture-limita ions  not ffect f-budget ctivity. le e y rgue that 
is i ding uggest  at e nett and nzo pothesi  t lid, 
Table 3. Off-budget regressions a (normalized by GSP) 
Constant 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 
12.31 6.74 6.65 13.31 7.09 6.96 16.44 
GRANTS -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 
1.77 3.37 3.27 3.66 3.66 
ON 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
8.73 8.50 8.82 8.82 
TEL -0.0002 
0.14 
GON 0.25 0.15 
3.19 2.24 
DEBT -0.005 0.0065 
1.46 1.27 
R2 .04 .63 .62 .16 .66 .64 .01 
F 3.14 42.17 27.52 10.18 32.24 29.52 1.61 
n 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
s.e.e. .0087 .0054 .0054 .0081 .0052 .0053 .0088 
a t-statistics below estimated coefficient. 
we argue that a more valid test of their hypothesis would be to consider the rela- 
tion between TEL and total government activity since OFF is only one avenue 
for a change caused by TEL to appear. Our finding that TEL is not statistically 
significant may suggest hree possibilities: (1)that tax- and expenditure- 
limitations do not affect off-budget activity (2) that the effects of such limita- 
tions manifest themselves somewhere else in the financing of the public sector 
or (3) cross-sectional studies may not be suitable for testing the significance of 
TEL. With respect to the third, unless one assumes that the cross-sectional data 
represents steady-state r actions to TEL, it may be difficult, if not impossible, 
to interpret the coefficient onTEL in a simple cross-sectional framework. Tax- 
and expenditure-limitations may be weak or ineffective in any event. 
Table 3 displays the results for data normalized by GSP. While, based on 
~2_ and F-statistic criteria, the equation as a whole is less significant than the 
previous one, the overall ability of the equations to explain off-budget activity 
remains very high. The only major differences associated with the different 
normalization are (1)that GON's coefficient is statistically significant and 
positive when included by itself and turns significant and negative when it is 
included with ON and (2)the debt variable DEBT loses its statistical sig- 
nificance. 
In sum, support for three hypotheses i  found. One, on-budget activity is a 
strong positive determinant of off-budget activity. Two, GRANTS is found to 
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rmalization re 1) that s ef icient tatistically ignificant nd 
sitive en cluded  self nd rns ignificant nd gative en   
cluded ith nd 2) the bt riable ses its tatistical ig­
ificance. 
 m, pport r re  pothese  s und. e, -budget ctivity  a 
trong sitive etermina t  ff-budget ctivity. ,   und  
 exert significant negative effects on off-budget activity. Three, within our 
cross-sectional framework, tax- and expenditure-limitations arenot found to 
exert significant effects on off-budget activity. However, as noted above, this 
framework may not be appropriate for the testing for the permanent effect of 
TEL on off-budget activity. 
Not withstanding the above results, a caveat common to all comparative 
cross-sectional studies of government budgets needs to be mentioned. Given 
their historical and cultural backgrounds as well as the stages of economic de- 
velopment, he possibilities for going off-budget may have been long exhausted 
in some states. This problem, of course could have been far worse had we used 
time series data where the size of off-budget activities is stationary in some 
states and varies in others. 
5. Conclusion 
The primary finding of this paper is that the off-budget activity of the public 
sector is significantly and positively related to on-budget activity by state and 
local governments. We suggest he following policy implications. One, there 
appears to be evidence that the composition of total government activity is 
related to the relative costs of the alternative avenues of providing overnmen- 
tal activity. Future research into determining the nature of the relative cost 
differences may be one useful means of understanding both the composition 
of government activity as well as its total size. Two, our ability to measure the 
"true" size of public sector participation i the economy must go well beyond 
our attempt here. While we have presented information on one of the impor- 
tant "hidden" elements of public sector participation, we are still a long way 
from effectively incorporating similar data on legislation, regulations and so 
forth into our empirical tests. Further research into these issues is clearly war- 
ranted. 
Notes 
1. For example, Wagner's law (Wagner, 1893), special interest group formations (Olson, 1982), 
bureaucratic monopoly power (Niskanen, 1971), rent-seeking activity (Weede, 1984), fiscal il- 
lusion (Buchanan and Wagner, 1978), crises (Higgs, 1985), legislator specialization (Crain, 
Tollison, Goff and Carlson, 1985), extending voting franchises (Meltzer and Richards, 1983), 
and the demand for protection (Bordo and Landau, 1987). 
2. Buchanan and Flowers (1969) is an early study setting the stage for the tax revolt. Studies that 
question the effectiveness of various tax limitations on government are Bennett and DiLorenzo 
(1982), Bails (1982), Toma and Toma (1983), Stein, Hamm and Freeman (1983), Abrams and 
Dougan (1986) and Marlow and Orzechowski (1988). 
3. See, for example, Nuner (1978) or Marlow (1986) for traditional measures ofgovernment size. 
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.	 r xample, gner's  agner, 893), pecial terest roup formations l on, 982), 
ureaucratic onopoly power iskanen, 971), nt-seeking ctivity eede, 984), cal ­
sion chana  nd gner, 978), rises iggs, 985), gislator pecialization rain, 
l ison, ff nd rlson, 985), xtending ting nchise  ltzer nd hards, 983), 
nd the emand for p otection (B rdo nd ndau, 987). 
. chanan d ers \ 969)  n arly tudy etting e tage r e x volt. tudies at 
uestion e ffectiven ss f rious x itations overnment re Bennett nd i renzo 
982), ils \982), a nd a 983), tein, mm and eman 983), rams nd 
ugan \986) nd rlow nd rzechowski 98 ). 
. ee, r xample, tter \978) r rlow \986) r radit onal easures f overnment ize. 
4. See Bennett and Johnson (1980) for a discussion of problems related to the estimation of the 
size of the public sector. 
5. One problem with using these data for empirical testing of hypotheses is the necessity of 
simple-summing all legislative input. That is, it is not clear what relative weights one should 
attach to dissimilar activities. For example, enactment of a new regulatory agency for con- 
sumer matters i potentially more participatory than introduction of a new name for some ex- 
isting Commission, or legislation calling for "National Pickle Week." 
6. More precisely, Buchanan and Wagner (1978) argue that a growing Keynesian bias toward 
deficit finance and the political affinity of spending without axing are causal elements behind 
growing use of deficit finance. 
7. The nineteen states are." Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. Note, however, that we have excluded Alaska from 
our example. 
8. A related hypothesis is that structure and complexity of tax systems i one way to create fiscal 
illusion. For studies of this hypothesis, ee Wagner (1976), Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), 
Breeden and Hunter (1985), and Feenberg and Rosen (1987). 
9. That is, our model assumes a constant relative cost of financing total government via off- 
budget finance. A more complex model might assume that the relative cost perception by the 
public might be linear up to some threshold and rise quickly thereafter. See Marlow (1988) for 
a similar point in the area of taxpayer-perceived prices of deficit finance. 
10. For further detail, see U.S. Department of Commerce (1985a). 
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